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A moral being is one who is capable of re!ecting on his past actions 
and their motives—of approving of some and disapproving of 
others; and the fact that man is the one being who certainly deserves 
this designation, is the greatest of all distinctions between him and 
the lower animals.
Charles Darwin2
It has been over ten years since Michael Murray and Glenn Ross 
published their article “Neo-Cartesianism and the Problem of Animal 
Su"ering.”3 #e arguments in that article later served as a major aspect 
of Murray’s defense of theism in his work on the problem of animal 
su"ering titled Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: !eism and the Problem 
of Animal Su"ering.4 Murray’s book was especially signi$cant at the time 
because few, if any, monographs had been published covering the prob-
lem of animal su"ering.5
1  I am grateful to Michael J. Murray, J. #omas Bridges, and an anonymous reviewer 
for their helpful comments on previous versions of this essay.
2   Charles Darwin, Descent of Man, 2nd ed. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998 
[originally 1874]), 633.  
3   Michael J. Murray and Glenn Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism and the Problem of 
Animal Su"ering,” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006): 169–90.
4   Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: !eism and the Problem of 
Animal Su"ering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
5  Christopher Southgate’s work was published the same year: !e Groaning of 
Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2019): 93–125 93
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#e argument in “Neo-Cartesianism and the Problem of Animal 
Su"ering,” inspired by René Descartes, emphasizes that there is no 
evidence proving that nonhuman animals phenomenologically experience 
pain. Murray and Ross argue that, although some nonhuman animals 
have physiological systems that are analogous to the systems in humans 
that make the phenomenological experience of pain possible, there is no 
evidence necessitating the conclusion that nonhuman animals do phenom-
enologically experience pain.6
#ey suggest it is possible that nonhuman animals exhibit pain-averse 
behaviors even though they might not phenomenologically experience 
pain. Murray and Ross mention that it does not seem that the actual 
awareness of pain would add to the evolutionary advantage of pain-avoid-
ing behaviors.7 #us, if one has good reasons to believe that theism is true, 
then there is room to believe that nonhuman animals do not phenomeno-
logically experience pain, since it would seem that God would not allow 
them to do so.8
Murray’s and Ross’s article is signi$cant regarding the problem of 
animal su"ering in that, if nonhuman animals do not phenomenologically 
experience pain, then there is no problem of animal su"ering. However, 
few scholars have found the neo-Cartesian position compelling. Many, 
including theists, have argued that neo-Cartesian arguments fail and that 
the problem of animal su"ering still stands.9
Indeed, some theists have even argued that the problem is probably 
worse than many have thought.10 So, although there have been a few other 
major attempts at defending theism from the problem of animal su"ering 
(involving evolutionary and soul-making theodicies), it seems that theists 
Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2008).
6   Murray and Ross emphasize that they do not necessarily believe that neo-Car-
tesianism is true, but rather that the possibility of its truth is signi$cant for the 
problem of animal su"ering ( “Neo-Cartesianism,” 186).
7   Murray and Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism,” 177.
8   Murray and Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism,” 171–72, 186.
9  For examples, see: Nicola Hoggard Creegan, Animal Su"ering and the Problem 
of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 31–32, 51–53; Robert Fran-
cescotti, “#e Problem of Animal Pain and Su"ering,” in !e Blackwell Companion 
to the Problem of Evil, ed. Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Somer-
set, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2013), 114–21; and Trent Dougherty, !e Problem 
of Animal Pain: A !eodicy for All Creatures Great and Small (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 56–95.
10   See Dustin Crummett, “#e Problem of Evil and the Su"ering of Creeping 
#ings,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82, no. 1 (2017): l 71–88.
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have not been successful at providing compelling arguments against the 
problem of animal su"ering.11
With this situation in mind, the present article attempts to provide a 
solution to the problem of animal su"ering similar to Murray and Ross’s 
neo-Cartesian arguments. Particularly, I will discuss a solution to the 
problem of animal su"ering involving concepts taken from the medieval 
philosopher/theologian #omas Aquinas. First, I will brie!y discuss the 
problem of animal su"ering and how the possible neo-Cartesian positions 
regarding nonhuman animal minds avoid the problem. #ese positions 
will help provide a contrast when I next describe Aquinas’s positions 
regarding animal souls and human self-awareness. A&er describing the 
neo-Cartesian and #omistic positions, I will discuss contemporary phil-
osophical and scienti$c viewpoints regarding animal rationality, metacog-
nition, and episodic memory. #e contemporary evidence will help me to 
propose a neo-#omistic view of animal minds in relation to the problem 
of animal su"ering. A&er considering an objection, I will conclude that 
the neo-#omistic view provides a more compelling alternative to the 
neo-Cartesian solution to the problem of animal su"ering.
Animal Minds and the Problem of Animal Suering
#e problem of animal su"ering slowly emerged over the years as modern 
science made discoveries regarding the age of the earth and the number of 
creatures that lived prior to the arrival of anatomically modern humans. 
Traditional answers to the problem of evil did not cover these new discov-
eries. For example, fossil remains indicating that animals lived and died 
much earlier than humans suggest that animals were dying and su"ering 
before Adam and Eve could have sinned. #is not only sheds doubt on 
11  Creegan and Dougherty both reject neo-Cartesianism, but neither provides 
compelling alternatives. Creegan does not o"er a theodicy because she thinks 
we may never fully understand why evil exists in creation (Animal Su"ering, 55). 
Dougherty o"ers an animal soul-making theodicy in !e Problem of Animal Pain 
that seems to contradict the very raison d’être of soul-making theodicies. For exam-
ple, although Dougherty provides plenty of argumentation as to why God should 
resurrect animals in the eschaton, he does not explain how the earthly lives of 
animals can give rise to personality traits that cannot surface without the existence 
of actual or possible su"ering (Michael J. Murray, review of !e Problem of Animal 
Pain: A !eodicy for All Creatures Great and Small, by Trent Dougherty, Interna-
tional Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 [2015]: 138). Elsewhere, Southgate 
makes little progress with arguments that he mentions are not necessarily meant 
to solve the problem of animal su"ering, but merely to explain why God cannot 
prevent/eliminate animal su"ering (!e Groaning of Creation, 15–17).
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traditional Fall theodicies but also causes problems for free-will and 
soul-making theodicies. Indeed, before Darwin, theodicies seemed to be 
solely concerned with solving the problem of human su"ering. In light 
of this, proponents of the problem of animal su"ering emphasize that an 
all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God would most likely not include 
millions of years of animal su"ering in the process by which he decided 
to create humanity. #us, given the amount of animal su"ering found in 
the earth’s natural history, an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God 
most likely does not exist.
Neo-Cartesianism
As mentioned, the neo-Cartesian answer to this problem is to deny that 
nonhuman animals are aware of any pain. If nonhuman animals lack 
phenomenological awareness of pain and su"ering, then there can be 
no problem of animal su"ering. Murray and Ross discuss four similar 
but di"erent options from which neo-Cartesians can choose regarding 
animals and pain. (1) “Many non-human creatures are conscious inasmuch 
as they are alive, awake and have sensations. . . . Yet, unlike the sensory 
states possessed by humans, the mechanisms whereby these organisms 
have access to the world lack any phenomenal character whatsoever.”12 
(2) “For a mental state to be a conscious state (phenomenally) requires an 
accompanying higher-order mental state (a HOT) that has that state as its 
intentional object. . . . Only humans have the cognitive faculties required 
to form the conception of themselves being in a $rst-order state that one 
must have in order to have a HOT.”13 (3) “Some non-human creatures 
have states that have intrinsic phenomenal qualities analogous to those 
possessed by humans when they are in states of pain. #ese creatures lack, 
however, any higher-order states of being aware of themselves as being in 
$rst-order states.”14 and (4) “Most creatures lack the cognitive faculties 
required to be in a higher-order state of recognizing themselves to be in a 
$rst-order state of pain. #ose [non-human creatures] that can on occasion 
achieve a second-order access to their $rst-order states of pain, nonetheless 
do not have the capacity to regard that second-order state as undesirable.”15
So, more brie!y, according to Murray and Ross, neo-Cartesianism 
entails that animals either (1) lack phenomenal consciousness, (2) lack the 
higher-order mental states required for phenomenal consciousness, (3) are 
12  Murray and Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism,” 175.
13   Murray and Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism,” 176.
14   Murray and Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism,” 176.
15   Murray and Ross, “Neo-Cartesianism,” 177.
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phenomenally conscious of pain but lack higher-order mental states, or (4) 
are phenomenally aware of pain, with some having higher-order mental 
states regarding the pain but lacking the capacity to regard such higher 
states as undesirable. If any one of these four options were true, then the 
apparent su"ering found in nature would be illusory and the problem of 
animal su"ering would dissolve.
#ese four possible options are called neo-Cartesian because they draw 
inspiration from Descartes famous position regarding animal minds. 
Descartes’s philosophy entails that the immaterial mind/soul provides 
human beings with the capacity for conscious mental states.16 #us, if 
animals do not demonstrate the capacity for rational thought, then it 
seems they would lack both minds/souls and phenomenal consciousness.17 
#ese four neo-Cartesian positions emphasize that there is no evidence 
necessitating the conclusion that animals possess phenomenal conscious-
ness. #us, they conclude that God’s non-existence does not necessarily 
follow from the appearance of animal su"ering.
!omism
#omas Aquinas is also famous for his position regarding animal minds. 
Following Aristotle, Aquinas believed that human beings possess rational 
souls while animals possess only sensitive souls.18 Humans are capable of 
consciousness and movement, as are other animals, but humans are the 
only animals with the abilities of the intellect and will. #is crucial di"er-
ence entails that nonhuman animals lack the ability to understand what 
they experience and are unable to act rationally:
In the souls of brute animals . . . there is no operation superior to 
those of the sensitive part, since they neither understand nor reason. 
#is is evident from the fact that all animals of the same species 
16   René Descartes, Discourse on Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking 
the Truth in the Sciences, part IV.
17  Some of Descartes’s writings indicate that his mature view regarding animals was 
closer to the Aristotelian/#omistic view than to the view that many attribute to 
him (see Gary Steiner, “Descartes, Christianity, and Contemporary Speciesism,” 
in A Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, ed. Paul 
Waldau and Kimberly Patton [New York: Columbia University Press, 2006], 
118–23, and John Cottingham, Descartes’ Treatment of Animals,” in Descartes, 
ed. John Cottingham [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 225–33). 
However, much of his philosophy entails that animals lack phenomenal conscious-
ness.
18  For example, see #omas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles [SCG] II, ch. 60.
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operate in the same way, as though moved by nature and not as 
operating by art; every swallow builds its nest and every spider spins 
its web, in the same manner. #e souls of brutes, then, are incapable 
of any operation that does not involve the body.19
As will be discussed below, the nonhuman-animal lack of intellect and 
will entails that they are not moral agents and that their su"ering is not 
morally signi$cant.
#is might seem to be almost identical with the Cartesian position.20 
Indeed, Cartesianism and #omism are similar in that rationality serves 
in both as a criterion for moral agency and personhood. However, there are 
signi$cant di"erences between the two positions. Cartesianism believes 
that the mind/soul is what gives humans the ability to possess conscious-
ness and rationality. Nonhuman animals are thought to be alive, but 
irrational and nonconscious. #is, of course, is why neo-Cartesianism is 
concerned mainly with determining to what degree nonhuman animals 
possess phenomenal consciousness. #omism holds that the soul is the 
principle of life in biological organisms and is that which distinguishes 
life from nonlife. #ere are di"erent types of souls (vegetative, sensitive, 
and rational), and they possess di"erent types of abilities (reproduction, 
movement, and rationality, respectively).
For Cartesianism, testing for rationality in nonhuman animals is only 
one way for trying to determine if they are conscious. If they possess 
rationality, then they necessarily possess a mind/soul and are conscious. 
So, neo-Cartesianism is mainly concerned with whether animals have 
any degree of phenomenal consciousness, not necessarily whether they 
exhibit human levels of rationality. For #omism, testing for rationality 
and self-consciousness is the main ways to determine if animals are persons 
capable of moral agency. #is is because, according to Aquinas, conscious-
ness is necessary to explain many animal behaviors:
For the type of every act or operation is determined by an object. 
Every operation of the soul is the act of a potentiality—either active 
19  #omas Aquinas, Summa theologiae [ST] II-II, q. 25, a. 3. All quotes from the 
ST are from #omas Aquinas, Summa !eologica, trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947).
20  Regardless of the debate regarding Descartes’s position on animals, for sake of ease, 
I will use the terms “Cartesian position” and “Cartesianism” to refer to the view 
o&en attributed to Descartes entailing that animals lack phenomenal conscious-
ness because they lack immaterial minds/souls.
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or passive. Now the objects of passive potentialities stand to these as 
the causal agents which bring each potentiality into its proper activ-
ity; and it is thus that visible objects, and indeed all sensible things, 
are related to sight and to the other senses.21
Here he is mentioning that objects in nature act on the passive senses 
of organisms. If an organism reacts to sights, sounds, smells, and so on, it 
is inferred that such an organism possesses the sense or senses that explain 
such behavior. Aquinas was not concerned with “what it is like” to be an 
organism, but only whether an organism possesses the ability to sense its 
environment. John Haldane helps to explain this further:
#ere is an old Aristotelian principle according to which acts are 
distinguished by their respective objects, powers are known by 
their acts, and substances are de$ned by their powers. . . .What is 
of prime importance in determining if an individual is sensate is 
not the question of what it is like to be it, or even whether that 
Nagelian question arises; but rather the issue of how the individual 
is related to its environment. We do not need telepathy in order to 
attribute sensory awareness, for perception shows itself in the eye of 
the perceiver—vultus est index animi. On this basis there can be no 
serious doubt that dogs see other dogs.22
So, as Haldane suggests, #omism does not entail a skepticism toward 
animal consciousness, while neo-Cartesianism does. If an organism reacts 
to its environment, it is assumed that the organism is conscious of that to 
which it reacts.
Aquinas on Reasoning and Self-Knowledge
In #omism, rationality and self-awareness are the main criteria for moral 
agency and personhood for two major reasons. One is that the intellect and 
will are thought to be immaterial, making it possible for rational animals 
to possess free will. #e other is that Aquinas’s theory of self-knowledge 
entails that animals without intellects cannot be self-aware. To better 
understand these concepts, it will be good to discuss them further and 
21  #omas Aquinas, In II de anima, lec. 6, no. 305, found in Aristotle’s De Anima, 
in the version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. !omas Aquinas, 
trans. Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1951).
22  John Haldane, Reasonable Faith (New York: Routledge, 2010), 122–23.
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draw out their implications for personhood.
Reasoning
#e Aristotelian/#omistic concept of reasoning sometimes gets confused 
in the contemporary discussion regarding animal minds. Indeed, the term 
“rational” can mean many di"erent things, depending on the discipline of 
the person using it. For example, Alex Kacelnik has emphasized that there 
are at least three di"erent meanings of “rational” used across the disciplines 
of philosophy, psychology, economics, and biology.23 #us, it is crucial to 
be clear on the meaning of this term as understood in #omism.
Following the Islamic philosopher Avicenna, Aquinas believes that 
nonhuman animals possess an “estimative power” that allows them to 
recognize intentions that are not directly perceived by their senses.24 #e 
estimative power is similar to animal survival instincts and, among other 
things, recognizes whether something is useful or harmful to the animal 
perceiving.25 #is power involves nonhuman animals processing and react-
ing to sense data they perceive and resembles empirical induction.
While nonhuman animals only appear to use logical reasoning (as they 
really use their estimative power), rational animals (humans) are able to 
reason because they possess immaterial intellects. For example, in a simple 
syllogism, there are both universal and particular concepts involved. #e 
intellect is necessary to know and understand the universal statement that 
“all men are mortal.” #e senses are necessary to observe the particular 
statement that “Socrates is a man.” #e intellect concludes that “Socrates 
is mortal” based on the relation between the particular Socrates (who 
is judged to be a man) and the universal concept of humanity (which is 
known to always include mortality). Without the intellect, it would be 
impossible to know universal concepts, because universal concepts are 
immaterial.26 When universal concepts (forms) are conjoined with matter, 
they become particular instances of themselves. But observing a partic-
ular human will never give full knowledge of humanity. It is only when 
the universal and immaterial concept of humanity is abstracted from a 
particular human and stored in the immaterial intellect that knowledge of 
humanity is possible. 
#us, Aquinas believes that nonhuman animals are not capable of 
23  Alex Kacelnik, “Meanings of Rationality,” in Rational Animals? ed. Susan Hurley 
and Matthew Nudds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 87–106.
24  ST I, q. 78, a. 4; Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de anima [Q.D. de anima], a. 13.
25  Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 258.
26  See ST I, q. 75, a. 5, and De veritate, q. 10, a. 8.
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complex abstract reasoning. Nonhuman animals are completely physical 
and do not possess immaterial intellects.27 #us, they are unable to “know” 
universal forms and make judgments based on these forms and their 
relations. All they are able to do is observe particulars and react to their 
observations through their estimative powers.28
Self-Knowledge
Besides reasoning, Aquinas believes that the immaterial intellect makes it 
possible for rational animals to possess self-knowledge. #e intellect makes 
this possible in two distinct ways: the self can be known through philo-
sophical argumentation and also through the act of understanding.29 #e 
latter way is the most important for the current discussion.
#e intellect, according to Aquinas, is composed of two distinct powers: 
the passive intellect and the active intellect.30 Aquinas believes that, when 
the active intellect abstracts a form and deposits it into the passive intel-
lect, the knower not only knows the form but also knows that they are 
knowing.31 So, in the act of knowing, the mind perceives itself. #is is intu-
itive self-knowledge, since it is gained through direct cognition, as opposed 
to the discursive reasoning involved in philosophical argumentation.32
Aquinas says that, in the act of knowing, the intellect judges that there 
is an “I” that is distinct from the object that is known.33 #is is because, 
as it gains knowledge, the intellect not only knows  but also knows that 
it knows. #e knower cognizes objects as objects that are known by 
a knower, an “I,” and this creates an intuitive subject–object relation 
between knower and thing known.34
When the “I” is perceived in the act of knowing, the intellect judges 
that the “I” exists.35 Aquinas believes that, when the intellect cognizes 
27  SCG II, ch. 82.
28  #is would not qualify as rationality for Aquinas, but it is similar to the under-
standing of “rationality” in biology, which understands it as performing actions 
that are conducive to $tness. See Kacelnik, “Meanings of Rationality,” 87–106.
29  #erese Scarpelli Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 63–64. See ST I, q. 87, a. 1, and De veritate, q. 10, a. 8.
30  ST I, q. 79, aa. 2–3; Q.D. de anima, a. 4.
31  ST I, q. 87, a. 3; q. 93, a. 7, ad 4; SCG III, ch. 46.
32  For an in-depth treatment of this process of intuitive self-awareness see Cory, 
Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 69–133.
33  Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 84.
34  Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 204.
35  Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 84.
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something, it judges that the thing exists.36 #us, if the intellect cognizes 
an “I” in the process of knowing, it also judges that the “I” exists.37 Over 
time, this awareness of an “I” produces a diachronic unity of consciousness 
in that it is known that the same “I” remains throughout all experiences.38
Nonhuman animals are thought to lack self-awareness because they 
are unable to perform acts of the mind such as simple apprehension and 
reasoning. #ey can sense and remember things, but this happens only on 
the level of particulars. #eir lack of an immaterial intellect renders them 
incapable of storing universal concepts. Accordingly, they do not experi-
ence the act of knowing like rational animals do.
Contemporary !eories Regarding Rationality and Self-Consciousness
Now that Aquinas’s position has been discussed, it will be good to review 
contemporary research regarding nonhuman animal minds. Since #om-
ism doubts the existence of abstract reasoning and self-awareness in 
nonhuman animals, I will discuss only contemporary research regarding 
these concepts. So, in what follows, I will focus on contemporary $ndings 
regarding animal rationality, metacognition, and episodic memory.
Abstract Reasoning
As mentioned, research into nonhuman animal rationality can be confus-
ing because of the many di"erent uses of the term “rationality.” However, 
there has been plenty of contemporary research conducted on the speci$c 
type of abstract reasoning that #omism entails. #e literature on nonhu-
man animal rationality is massive, and space precludes a proper review. 
#us, I will emphasize only the most relevant theories and their objections.
#ere are many researchers who believe there is evidence suggesting 
that some animals are capable of various types of logical inferences, includ-
ing exclusionary inferences (great apes and dogs39), transitive inferences 
(monkeys, baboons, and sea lions40), and causal inferences (apes, monkeys, 
36  De veritate, q. 10, a. 8.
37  Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 84.
38  Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 207.
39  For examples, see: Josep Call, “Descartes’ Two Errors: Reason and Re!ection in 
the Great Apes,” in Hurley and Nudds, Rational Animals? 219–34; Call, “Infer-
ences by Exclusion in the Great Apes: #e E"ect of Age and Species,” Animal 
Cognition 9 (2006): 393–403; and Ágnes Erdőhegyi, József Topál, Zsó$a Virányi, 
and Ádám Miklósi, “Dog-Logic: Inferential Reasoning in a Two-Way Choice Task 
and Its Restricted Use,” Animal Behaviour 74 (2007): 725–37.
40  For examples, see: Brendan O. McGonigle and Margaret Chalmers, “Are Monkeys 
Logical?” Nature 267 (1977): 694–96; McGonigle and Chalmers, “Monkeys 
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and rats41).42 For example, in an experiment involving several di"erent 
breeds, researchers tested for the existence of the ability for exclusionary 
inference in dogs.43 #e tests involved a ball and two containers. In the 
tests, an experimenter would call the dog, show the dog a ball, and place 
the ball under one of the identical containers in a way so that the dog could 
not see the location of the ball. A&erward, the experimenter would provide 
the dog with information regarding the location of the ball by either li&ing 
both containers, the empty container, or the container with the ball. #e 
dog was then allowed to attempt to $nd the ball for a reward. A second 
version of the tests involved the li&ing of the containers by strings with-
out an experimenter present. #e tests revealed that the dogs performed 
signi$cantly higher than chance results and led the researchers to conclude 
that dogs are able to perform exclusionary inferences.44
However, there is no consensus on the issue of abstract rationality in 
animals, as its existence is doubted by other researchers.45 For example, 
Are Rational!” !e Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 45B (1992): 
198–228; Ronald J. Schusterman, Colleen Reichmuth Kastak, and David Kastak, 
“#e Cognitive Sea Lion: Meaning and Memory in the Laboratory and in Nature,” 
in !e Cognitive Animal: Empirical and !eoretical Perspectives on Animal Cogni-
tion, ed. Marc Beko", Colin Allen, and Gordon M. Burghardt (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2002), 217–28; and Robert M. Seyfarth and Dorothy L. Cheney, “#e 
Structure of Social Knowledge in Monkeys,” in Beko", Allan, and Burghardt, !e 
Cognitive Animal, 379–84.
41  For examples, see: Anthony Dickinson and David Shanks, “Instrumental Action 
and Causal Representation,” in Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate, 
ed. Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1995), 5–25; Call, “Descartes’ Two Errors,” 219, 234; Aaron P. Blaisdell, Kosuke 
Sawa, Kenneth J. Leising, and Michael R. Waldmann, “Causal Reasoning in Rats,” 
Science 311 (2006): 1020–22; and Marc D. Hauser and Laurie R. Santos, “#e 
Evolutionary Ancestry of Our Knowledge of Tools: From Percepts to Concepts,” 
in Creations of the Mind: !eories of Artifacts and !eir Representation, ed. Eric 
Margolis and Stephen Laurence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
267–88.
42  Jacob Beck, “Do Animals Engage in Conceptual #ought?” Philosophy Compass 7 
(2012): 225–26.
43  Erdőhegyi, Topál, Virányi, and Miklósi, “Dog-Logic,” 725–37.
44  Erdőhegyi, Topál, Virányi, and Miklósi, “Dog-Logic,” 734–35.
45  For examples, see: José Luis Bermúdez, !inking Without Words (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 109–32; Derek C. Penn and Daniel J. Povinelli, 
“Causal Cognition in Human and Nonhuman Animals: A Comparative, Critical 
Review,” Annual Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 97–118; and Derek C. Penn, 
Keith J. Holyoak, and Daniel J. Povinelli, “Darwin’s Mistake: Explaining the 
Discontinuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds,” Behavioral and Brain 
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José Bermúdez argues that it is possible that animals are not using the 
same kind of abstract logic as humans use, but are instead using a type of 
proto-logic.46 Bermúdez believes that nonhuman animals are unable to 
perform abstract reasoning without language. Since nonhuman animals 
can think only nonlinguistically, they are unable to make truth judgments 
regarding their thoughts, since they lack the means to label their thoughts 
as true or false. 
#is would entail that the dogs were not performing an exclusionary 
inference such as:
1. Either the ball is in container A or the ball is in container B.
2. It is not true that the ball is in container A.
3. #erefore, it is true that the ball is in container B.
Instead, they would perform a proto-logical process similar to:
1. #e ball is absent from container A.
2. #e ball is in container B.
Without the ability to form thoughts about thoughts, such as “either A 
or B,” the dogs would be unable to formulate the proposition that establishes 
a disjunctive syllogism. Furthermore, even if they were able to establish the 
$rst proposition, they would be unable to formulate a truth-conditional 
thought such as “it is not true that A” so as to guarantee the truth of the 
conclusion. Instead, utilizing a type of proto-logic, the dogs would be able 
to quickly learn to associate two subcontraries: “#e ball is absent from 
container A” is associated with “#e ball is in container B.”
#us, it could appear that the dogs use exclusionary inferences, when 
in fact they are simply associating subcontraries. #ey may not consider 
abstract logical relations, but merely perform the action that usually leads 
to a reward upon observing the absence of the ball in one of two containers. 
#eir actions appear logical, but the process that determines their actions 
is not based on logic and does not produce necessarily valid conclusions.
Regarding the other types of reasoning, researchers have proposed ways 
in which it is possible that animals appear to use abstract reasoning but do 
not.47 For example, in addition to Bermúdez’s proposal, Michael Rescorla 
Sciences 31 (2008): 109–30.
46  José Luis Bermúdez, “Animal Reasoning and Proto-Logic,” in Hurley and Nudds, 
Rational Animals? 127–38.
47  Beck, “Do Animals Engage in Conceptual #ought?” 226.
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suggests it is possible that the appearance of exclusionary inferences can 
be explained by a process of Bayesian updating (named for #omas Bayes) 
over cognitive maps.48 Associative learning and/or innate biases are also 
thought to provide an explanation for the appearance of transitive and 
causal inferences.49
Alongside this debate, there is a major position in the $eld of psychol-
ogy called “dual-system theory” that is pertinent to the current discussion. 
Dual-system theorists hold that there are two distinct reasoning systems 
involved in human cognition.50 System 1 involves associative and intuitive 
processes, while system 2 involves rule-based and analytical processes. 
System-1 processes are thought to be automatic and non-conscious, while 
system-2 processes are thought to be controlled and conscious.51 Table 1 
illustrates the two types of systems involved in dual-systems theory.
48  Michael Rescorla, “Cognitive Maps and the Language of #ought,” !e British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2009): 377–407.
49  See: #omas R. Zentall, “#e Case for a Cognitive Approach to Animal Learning 
and Behavior,” Behavioural Processes 54 (2001): 65–78; C. De Lillo, D. Floreano, 
and F. Antinucci, “Transitive Choices by a Simple, Fully Connected, Backprop-
agation Neural Network: Implications for the Comparative Study of Transitive 
Inference,” Animal Cognition 4 (2001): 61–68; Collin Allen, “Transitive Inference 
in Animals: Reasoning or Conditioned Associations?” in Hurley and Nudds, 
Rational Animals? 175–86; and Penn and Povinelli, “Causal Cognition.”
50  For a somewhat recent explanation and review of dual-system theories, see Keith 
Frankish, “Dual-Process and Dual-System #eories of Reasoning,” Philosophy 
Compass 5 (2010): 914–26.
51  Frankish, “Dual-Process and Dual-System #eories,” 914.
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Table 1: Features Attributed to Aspects of the Dual-Systems
Source: Condensed from Frankish, "Dual-Process an Dual-System #eories of Reason-
ing" (see note 50), 992.
Dual-process and dual-system theories have been prominent in the 
$eld of psychology for decades, starting in the late 1970s.52 Researchers 
argue for these theories mainly based on $ndings from studies performed 
on human reasoning processes.53 But there are dual-system theorists who 
believe that processes in system 2 are evolutionarily late and uniquely 
human.54 For example, Jonathan Evans explains:
52  Frankish, “Dual-Process and Dual-System #eories,” 916; Jonathan St. B. T. Evans 
and Keith E. Stanovich, “Dual-Process #eories of Higher Cognition: Advancing 
the Debate,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 8, no. 3 (2013): 223–41, at 223.
53  See: Seymour Epstein, “Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic 
Unconscious,” American Psychologist 49 (1994): 709–24; Eliot R. Smith and Jamie 
DeCoster, “Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual 
Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems,” Personality and Social 
Psychology Review 4 (2000): 108–31; Arie W. Kruglanski and Edward Orehek, 
“Partitioning the Domain of Social Inference: Dual Mode and Systems Models 
and #eir Alternatives,” Annual Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 291–316; and 
Frankish, “Dual-Process and Dual-System #eories.”
54  For examples, see: Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and David E. Over, Rationality and 
Reasoning (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 1996); Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, !ink-
ing Twice: Two Minds in One Brain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
and Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and the Re$ective Mind (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
System 1 System 2
Process Automatic Controlled
Nonconscious or preconscious Conscious
Heuristic Analytic
Associative Rule-based
Content Actual Hypothetical
Concrete Abstract
Contextualized Decontextualized
Evolution Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent
Shared with animals Unique to humans
Nonverbal Language-involving
Serves genetic goals (“short-
leash” control)
Serves individual goals (“long-
leash” control)
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It is evident that humans resemble other animals in some respects 
but are very di"erent in others. Quite obviously, no other animal 
can engage in the forms of abstract hypothetical thought that 
underlie science, engineering, literature, and many other human 
activities. More basically, we propose that other animals are much 
more limited in their metarepresentational and simulation abilities, 
thus leading to limitations (compared with humans) in their abil-
ity to carry out forms of behavior that depend on prior appraisal 
of possible consequences. #us, a key de$ning feature of Type 2 
processing—the feature that makes humans unique—is cognitive 
decoupling: the ability to distinguish supposition from belief and to 
aid rational choices by running thought experiments.55
#ere are many critics of dual-system theories, despite their major in!u-
ence in psychology. Opponents have argued that dual-system theories are 
o&en formulated using vague terms, contain unreliably aligned attributes 
(i.e., supposed attributes of systems 1 and 2 are not consistently observed 
together), view di"erent processes as types when they should view them as 
styles, and are supported by ambiguous or unconvincing evidence.56 #ese 
critics o&en suggest that the evidence put forward for dual-system theories 
can just as easily support single-process theories.57
However, Evans and Keith Stanovich emphasize that these critics o&en 
overgeneralize and make attacks that are aimed at all dual-system theories 
but do not apply to many of the nuanced dual-system positions.58 #ey 
argue that there is plenty of evidence to be found that supports a carefully 
55  Evans and Stanovich, “Dual-Process #eories of Higher Cognition,” 236.
56  Evans and Stanovich, “Dual-Process #eories of Higher Cognition,” 227.
57  For examples, see: Arie W. Kruglanski, Woo Young Chun, Hans Peter Erb, Anto-
nio Pierro, Lucia Mannetti, and Scott Spiegel, “A Parametric Unimodel of Human 
Judgment: Integrating Dual-Process Frameworks in Social Cognition from a 
Single-Mode Perspective,” in Social Judgments: Implicit and Explicit Processes, 
ed. Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D. Williams, and William von Hippel (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 137–61; Magda Osman, “An Evaluation of 
Dual-Process #eories of Reasoning,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 11 (2004): 
988–1010; Gideon Keren and Yaacov Schul, “Two Is Not Always Better #an 
One: A Critical Evaluation of Two-System #eories,” Perspectives on Psychological 
Science 4 (2009): 533–50; Arie W. Kruglanski and Gerd Gigerenzer, “Intuitive and 
Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles,” Psychological Review 
118 (2011): 97–109; and Peter Carruthers, “Animal Minds Are Real, (Distinc-
tively) Human Minds Are Not,” American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013): 
233–48.
58  Evans and Stanovich, “Dual-Process #eories of Higher Cognition,” 223–35.
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de$ned dual-process theory: “#e evidence [for dual-process theories] 
is compelling and . . . a very clear theoretical basis for the two-process 
distinction has now emerged. Such theories can account for a wide range 
of phenomena in the reasoning, judgment, and decision-making literatures 
that have been the subject of several recent books.”59 
Although the debate continues regarding whether animals are capable 
of abstract reasoning, there is plenty of evidence to support the conclusion 
that animals most likely are not capable of such reasoning. Although it 
might appear that they are able to perform what could be labeled as logi-
cal reasoning, there is o&en an explanation for their behavior that does 
not necessitate invoking abstract logic. At a minimum, it is reasonable 
to conclude that nonhuman animals do not act rationally, but rather are 
guided by system-1 processes.
Self-Awareness
#ere are several theories regarding which attributes would provide 
evidence of self-awareness if found in nonhuman animals. #e most widely 
researched include whether nonhuman animals possess mind-reading 
capabilities (i.e., theory of mind), mirror self-recognition, metacognition, 
and episodic memory.60 In what follows, due to space constraints, I will 
mainly discuss the debates regarding nonhuman animal metacognition and 
episodic memory.61
Metacognition
An area of research that is extremely pertinent to this essay is the scienti$c 
and philosophical study of human and nonhuman metacognition. As with 
rationality, there is more than one understanding of “metacognition” in 
59  Evans and Stanovich, “Dual-Process #eories of Higher Cognition,” 237.
60  For a good discussion of contemporary research into animal self-consciousness, see 
Kristin Andrews, !e Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal 
Cognition (New York: Routledge, 2015), 70–77.
61  I will not discuss mirror self-recognition because I do not think it provides 
compelling evidence for self-awareness. Skeptical researchers have argued that 
nonhuman animals might simply recognize their own bodies, not their own selves 
(e.g., Cecilia M. Heyes, “Re!ections on Self-Recognition in Primates,” Animal 
Behaviour 47 [1994]: 909–19, esp. 915), or recognize that their body and the 
body in the mirror are similar (for example, see #omas Suddendorf and David L. 
Butler, “#e Nature of Visual Self-Recognition,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 
[2013]: 121–27). Similarly, as will be shown below, it seems that self-recognition 
can be explained through anoetic awareness instead of autonoetic awareness. Also, 
I will not discuss nonhuman animal mind-reading for space reasons and because 
metacognition and episodic memory are more pertinent to Aquinas’s concepts.
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the literature. Metacognition is o&en narrowly de$ned as “thinking about 
one’s own thoughts.” More broadly, Joëlle Proust de$nes it as “the kinds of 
processes involved, and the self-knowledge gained, in thinking about, and 
in controlling, one’s own thinking.”62 
However, it is highly debated as to what quali$es as metacognition. 
Some researchers believe that metacognition necessarily involves repre-
senting one’s own mental state as a mental state.63 #is is known as the 
“self-attributive” view. A self-attributive thought would be a self-refer-
ential second-order representation of a $rst-order representation (e.g., “I 
believe that I know/perceive/believe/feel/etc. that it is raining”).64 Other 
researchers believe that metacognition merely requires controlling and 
monitoring one’s own cognitive processes.65 #is is thought to possibly 
involve nonconceptual, representational processes and is known as the 
“self-evaluative” view.
#e main debate regarding nonhuman animals and metacognition 
is not whether they are capable of self-attributive metacognition, but 
whether they are capable of self-evaluative metacognition. Accordingly, 
many researchers argue that nonhuman animals are capable of self-eval-
uative metacognition.66 For example, in one study conducted by Kazuo 
Fujita, two tu&ed capuchin monkeys were tested for the ability to recog-
nize their own memories.67 In the study, they were presented with a sample 
62  Joëlle Proust, “Metacognition,” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 11 (November 2010): 
989–98, at 989.
63  Proust, “Metacognition,” 989.
64  Santiago Arango-Muñoz, “Two Levels of Metacognition,” Philosophia 39, no. 1 
(2011): 71–82, at 73.
65  Proust, “Metacognition,” 989.
66  For examples, see: Wendy E. Shields, J. David Smith, and David A. Washburn, 
“Uncertain Responses by Humans and Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a 
Psychophysical Same-Di"erent Task,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 
126 (1997): 147–64; Robert R. Hampton, “Rhesus Monkeys Know When 
#ey Remember,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 98 (2001): 5359–62; David A. Washburn, J. David Smith, and 
Wendy E. Shields, “Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) Immediately Generalize 
the Uncertain Response,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes 32 (2006): 185–89; J. David Smith, Michael J. Beran, Joshua S. Redford, 
and David A. Washburn, “Dissociating Uncertainty Responses and Reinforce-
ment Signals in the Comparative Study of Uncertainty Monitoring,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 135 (2006): 282–97; and Nate Kornell, Lisa K. 
Son, and Herbert S. Terrace, “Transfer of Metacognitive Skill and Hint Seeking in 
Monkeys,” Psychological Science 18 (2007): 64–71.
67  Kazuo Fujita, “Metamemory in Tu&ed Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella),” 
Animal Cognition 12 (2009): 575–85.
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shape on a computer screen. A&er a delayed period of time, they were given 
the choice to bring up a screen that would present them with nine shapes 
(one of which matched the initial shape) or bring up a screen that had an 
escape button. If they chose the matching task and then correctly chose the 
matching shape, they were rewarded with food 100 percent of the time. If 
they chose the wrong shape, they received nothing and a buzzer sounded 
for half a second. If they chose the escape screen, they were rewarded with 
food 50–75 percent of the time. One of the monkeys was found to reliably 
opt out of the matching task when there was a signi$cant enough delay 
between the initial shape and the choice screen. If the delay between the 
screens was short enough, the same monkey regularly chose the matching 
task and its accompanied guaranteed reward for a correct answer. #is 
suggests that capuchins are capable of monitoring and/or recognizing their 
own memory traces.68 However, Fujita noted that the capuchins seemed to 
have access only to the strength of their memories and not the contents. 
So, although they seemed to possess metacognitive abilities regarding their 
memories, these were limited.
Other researchers believe that apparently self-evaluative behaviors 
in nonhuman animals are explainable through associative processes 
alone, without metacognition.69 For example, David Smith notes that it 
is possible that the rewards coinciding with the escape option in exper-
iments like Fujita’s become more attractive as the monkeys associate 
them with an easier reward.70 Likewise, Mike Le Pelley argues that the 
behavior of the monkeys can be explained as learning to associate harder 
trials with unpleasant stimuli, such as the buzzer sound.71 #us, instead 
of monitoring the strength of their own memories, it is possible that the 
monkeys are simply learning to associate longer waiting periods with 
unpleasant buzzer noises.
68  Fujita, “Metamemory,” 583–84.
69  For examples, see: Peter Carruthers, “Meta-Cognition in Animals: A Skeptical 
Look,” Mind and Language 23 (2008): 58–89; Robert R. Hampton, “Multiple 
Demonstrations of Metacognition in Nonhumans: Converging Evidence or 
Multiple Mechanisms?” Comparative Cognition and Behavior Reviews 4 (2009): 
17–28; J. Jozefowiez, J. E. R. Staddon, and D. T. Cerutti, “Metacognition in 
Animals: How Do We Know that #ey Know?” Comparative Cognition and 
Behavior Reviews 4 (2009): 29–39; M. E. Le Pelley, “Metacognitive Monkeys or 
Associative Animals? Simple Reinforcement Learning Explains Uncertainty in 
Nonhuman Animals,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 38 (2012): 686–708.
70  J. David Smith, “#e Study of Animal Metacognition,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
13 (2009): 389–96, at 390.
71  Le Pelley, “Metacognitive Monkeys or Associative Animals?” 686.
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Regardless, there are many researchers who believe that nonhuman 
animals lack the physiological capacity for metacognition.72 Indeed, the 
evidence has led some to formulate bold hypotheses in regard to human 
uniqueness. For example, philosopher Derek Penn, psychologist Keith 
Holyoak, and psychologist Daniel Povinelli have proposed what they call 
the “relational reinterpretation hypothesis.”73 #e hypothesis entails that 
“the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds extends . . . to 
any cognitive capability that requires reinterpreting perceptual relations in 
terms of higher-order, structural, role-governed relations.”74 In particular 
the hypothesis suggests that:
Animals of many taxa employ functionally compositional, particu-
lar-involving, syntactically structured mental representations about 
observable features, entities, and relations in the world around 
them. Furthermore, they form abstract representations about statis-
tical regularities they perceive in the behavior of certain classes of 
physical objects (e.g., observable causal relations) and other animate 
agents (e.g., a`liative interactions) and are capable of using these 
representations o"-line to make decisions in a !exible, reliable, and 
ecologically rational (i.e., adaptive) fashion. Human animals alone, 
however, possess the additional capability of reinterpreting these 
perceptually grounded representations in terms of higher-order, 
role-governed, inferentially systematic, explicitly structural rela-
tions—or, to be more precise, of approximating these higher-order 
features of a PSS [physical symbol system], subject to the evolved, 
content-speci$c biases and processing capacity limitations of the 
human brain.75
Santiago Arango-Muñoz believes that, in addition to the hypothesis 
72  For examples, see: Daniel J. Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk, “Chimpanzee Minds: 
Suspiciously Human?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003): 157–60; Povinelli 
and Vonk, “We Don’t Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee’s Mind,” in 
Hurley and Nudds, Rational Animals? 385–412; Carruthers, “Meta-Cognition 
in Animals,” 58–89; Joseph Call and Michael Tomasello, “Does the Chimpanzee 
Have a #eory of Mind? 30 Years Later,” Trends in Cognitive Science 12 (2008): 
187–92; and José Luis Bermúdez, “Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom,” in !e 
Philosophy of Animal Minds, ed. Robert W. Lurz (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 145–64.
73  Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli, “Darwin’s Mistake,” 127–29.
74  Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli, “Darwin’s Mistake,” 127.
75  Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli, “Darwin’s Mistake,” 127.
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of Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli, the evidence supports a two-level view 
of metacognition that is compatible with dual-process theories.76 He 
believes the self-attributive–self-evaluative debate is the result of both sides 
arguing that only one view is correct, when both views are correct in that 
each describes a distinct level of metacognition. Similarly to dual-process 
theories, Arango-Muñoz proposes that the self-attributive view is describ-
ing a high-level (system 2) form of metacognition in which subjects use 
concepts and theories to interpret their behavior.77 #e self-evaluative 
view describes a low-level (system 1) form of metacognition in which feel-
ings guide their subjects to adjust cognitive activities without engaging in 
second-order thought.78 He believes that nonhuman animals are capable of 
only low-level metacognition, while humans are capable of both low- and 
high-level metacognition.
Similarly, Janet Metcalfe and Lisa Son believe the evidence suggests 
a distinction between anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic metacognition.79 
Anoetic metacognition involves judgments that are stimulus-bound, 
spatially and temporally bound to the current time.80 In other words, it 
is an animal making judgments about what it is currently experiencing. 
Noetic metacognition involves making judgments about representations 
of objects and events that are not physically present.81 Finally, autonoetic 
metacognition involves self-referential judgments (similar to self-attribu-
tive metacognition). Metcalfe and Son discuss there not being su`cient 
evidence to conclude nonhuman animals are capable of autonoetic meta-
cognition and the fact that it is even debated whether nonhuman animals 
possess anoetic and noetic metacognitive abilities. 
#e existence of hypotheses such as these indicates the amount and 
compelling nature of the evidence against higher forms of nonhuman 
animal metacognition. Also, it is striking that some researchers believe the 
evidence points to dual types of metacognition in humans and nonhuman 
animals. #is adds to the strength of dual-process theories regarding ratio-
nality. As it stands, nonhuman animals are not viewed as serious candi-
dates for self-attributive or autonoetic metacognition.
76  Arango-Muñoz, “Two Levels of Metacognition,” 71–82.
77  Arango-Muñoz, “Two Levels of Metacognition,” 77.
78  Arango-Muñoz, “Two Levels of Metacognition.”
79  Janet Metcalfe and Lisa K. Son, “Anoetic, Noetic, and Autonoetic Metacognition,” 
in Foundations of Metacognition, ed. Michael J. Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef 
Perner, and Joëlle Proust (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 289–301.
80  Metcalfe and Son, “Anoetic, Noetic, and Autonoetic Metacognition,” 291.
81  Metcalfe and Son, “Anoetic, Noetic, and Autonoetic Metacognition,” 292.
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Episodic Memory
Besides self-attributive metacognition, episodic memory is probably one 
of the most promising attributes that indicates self-awareness. Episodic 
memory is a type of memory in which the subject remembering an event 
remembers the event from the subject’s perspective. #is is distinguished 
from semantic memory, which is simply remembering facts about the 
world apart from personal experience. Episodic memory is associated with 
self-awareness for reasons already mentioned. When people remember 
that events have happened to them, they develop a diachronic unity of 
consciousness over time.
Many researchers have argued there is evidence of episodic (or episod-
ic-like) memory in nonhuman animals.82 For example, one study involved 
testing for episodic memory in scrub jays, which are known for their food 
caching abilities.83 #e scrub jays were allowed to cache di"ering types of 
food that were either perishable (mealworms and crickets) or nonperish-
able (peanuts). #e study showed that, if the scrub jays were released before 
their preferred food became inedible, they would return to the locations of 
their preferred food. If they were released a&er their preferred food became 
inedible, they would return only to their nonpreferred food caches. #ese 
$ndings suggested that the scrub jays remembered at least the where, what, 
and when aspects of their food caching.84 #is is evidence of episodic-like 
memory, and possibly episodic memory.
However, as with metacognition, some researchers believe it is possible 
to explain episodic-like behavior in simpler terms.85 For example, it is 
82  For examples, see: Nicola S. Clayton and Anthony Dickinson, “Episodic-Like 
Memory During Cache Recovery by Scrub Jays,” Nature 395 (1998): 272–74; 
Stephanie J. Babb and Jonathan D. Crystal, “Episodic-Like Memory in the 
Rat,” Current Biology 16 (2006): 1317–21; Gema Martin-Ordas, Daniel Haun, 
Fernando Colmenares, and Joseph Call, “Keeping Track of Time: Evidence for 
Episodic-Like Memory in Great Apes,” Animal Cognition 13 (2010): 331–40; 
Miranda C. Feeney, William A. Roberts, and David F. Sherry, “Mechanisms of 
What-Where-When Memory in Black-Capped Chickadees (Poecile atricapillus): 
Do Chickadees Remember ‘When’?” Journal of Comparative Psychology 125 
(2011): 308–16; and Jonathan D. Crystal, Wesley T. Alford, Wenyi Zhou, and 
Andrea G. Hohmann, “Source Memory in the Rat,” Current Biology 23 (2013): 
387–91.
83  N. S. Clayton, D. P. Gri`ths, N. J. Emery, and A. Dickinson, “Elements of 
Episodic-Like Memory in Animals,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: 
London B 356 (2001): 1483–91.
84  Clayton, Gri`ths, Emery, and Dickinson, “Elements of Episodic-Like Memory in 
Animals,” 1490.
85  For examples, see: Howard Eichenbaum and Norbert Fortin, “Episodic Memory 
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possible the scrub jays simply possess real-time semantic (nonpersonal) 
knowledge of the locations and ages of their food caches.86 Recalling the 
possibilities involving the capuchins and their memories, it is possible 
that the scrub jays learned to associate longer time intervals with rotten 
food. #us, they could simply return to food caches of which they possess 
stronger memories or perishable-food caches only when shorter intervals 
have lapsed.87
One of the most interesting aspects of episodic memory, and also rele-
vant to this essay, is that episodic memory has been found to coincide with 
the ability to mentally “time-travel.” Mental time-travel is the ability to 
remember or to imagine oneself in the past or the future. Psychologists 
believe that the two coincide due in part to studies involving damage to 
the human brain. 
For example, in 1981, a man known as K.C. was involved in a motor-
cycle accident in which he su"ered brain damage.88 K.C. exhibited a rare 
type of retrograde amnesia in which he cannot remember anything that 
happened to him from a personal perspective (episodic memory), although 
he retained knowledge of facts about the world and himself (semantic 
memory). For example, K.C. knew the address and appearance of the 
house in which he spent his $rst nine years of life, but he did not remember 
a single event that took place there. Moreover, K.C. had a similar problem 
regarding thinking about his future. Endel Tulving explains that: 
K.C. cannot think about his own personal future. #us, when 
asked, he cannot tell the questioner what he is going to do later on 
that day, or the day a&er, or at any time in the rest of his life, any 
more than he can say what he did the day before or what events have 
happened in his life. When he is asked to describe the state of his 
mind when he thinks about his future, whether the next 15 minutes 
and the Hippocampus,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (2003): 
53–57; #omas Suddendorf and Janie Busby, “Mental Time Travel in Animals?” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003): 391–96; and Robert R. Hampton and 
Bennett L. Schwartz, “Episodic Memory in Nonhumans: What, and Where, is 
When?” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 14 (2004): 192–97.
86  Hampton and Schwartz, “Episodic Memory in Nonhumans,” 194.
87  Eichenbaum and Fortin, “Episodic Memory and the Hippocampus,” 55.
88  See R. Shayna Rosenbaum, Stefan Köhler, Daniel L. Schacter, Morris Moscovitch, 
Robyn Westmacott, Sandra E. Black, Fuqiang Gao, and Endel Tulving, “#e Case 
of K.C.: Contributions of a Memory-Impaired Person to Memory #eory,” Neuro-
psychologia 43 (2005): 989–1021.
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or the next year, he again says that it is “blank.”89
Studies of K.C. have led researchers to conclude that episodic and 
semantic memory are based in di"erent sets of neural mechanisms.90 #us, 
if a human or nonhuman animal possesses semantic memory, this does 
not necessarily entail that they will possess episodic memory. Also, as 
mentioned, K.C.’s case has led to the conclusion that episodic memory is 
necessary for mental time-travel. #is is striking because it entails that, if 
nonhuman animals do not possess the ability for episodic memory, then 
not only can they not remember the past from a personal perspective, but 
they also cannot think of or anticipate future personal events. As will be 
explained below, this has major implications for the problem of animal 
su"ering and the status of nonhuman animals regarding moral agency.
Additionally, Tulving emphasizes that the capacity for episodic memory 
does not just enable personal mental time-travel; it also enables a present 
sense of self:
To describe autonoetic consciousness with regards to episodic 
memory, there is a natural bias to cast the discussion in terms of 
awareness of the past. Autonoetic consciousness is not limited to 
the past, however; it encompasses the capacity to represent the self ’s 
experiences in the past, present, and future. When one is autonoet-
ically aware of one’s experiences in the past, one recollects the past 
and, therefore, retrieves information from episodic memory. But 
also dependent on autonoetic consciousness and, we argue, closely 
related to episodic memory is the ability to be aware of the self ’s 
present.91
#us, the absence of episodic memory in nonhuman animals suggests 
that they are not only unable to personally experience the past and future 
but also unable to personally experience the present.
As with rationality and metacognition, some researchers believe that 
episodic memory and the ability for personal mental time-travel are 
89  Endel Tulving, “Episodic Memory and Autonoesis: Uniquely Human?” in !e Miss-
ing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Re$ective Consciousness, ed. Herbert S. Terrace 
and Janet Metcalfe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4–56, at 26.
90  Tulving, “Episodic Memory and Autonoesis,” 24.
91  Mark A. Wheeler, Donald T. Stuss, and Endel Tulving, “Toward a #eory of 
Episodic Memory: #e Frontal Lobes and Autonoetic Consciousness,” Psychologi-
cal Bulletin 121, no. 3 (1997): 331–54, 335.
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unique to humans.92 #is is another area where the evidence points to 
dual processes in humans and nonhuman animals. Regarding memory, it 
seems that some nonhuman animals have episodic-like memory (knowing 
the impersonal where, what, and when of events), while humans uniquely 
possess both episodic-like and episodic memory. For example, Tulving 
explains that:
Many kinds of complex behaviors of many kinds of animals can be, 
and have been, interpreted as manifesting episodic memory, and 
in many cases these behaviors do have many features in common 
with behaviors that are grounded in episodic memory. Practically 
invariably, however, the same behaviors can also be interpreted 
more parsimoniously, as manifestations of semantic or declarative 
memory, which do not provide for, and do not require postulation 
of, the apprehension of subjective past or subjective future time.93
#us, to date, it seems that most, if not all, nonhuman animals do not 
have the capability for self-awareness that is found in humans. For one, 
the evidence suggests that humans uniquely possess the ability for high-
er-order metacognition. Nonhuman animals are not able to think about 
their thoughts, and thus are unaware of themselves as the possessors of 
such thoughts. Additionally, episodic memory is believed to be unique to 
humans. #is entails that nonhuman animals cannot remember the past as 
it happened to them personally or personally experience the present. #is 
also means nonhuman animals are unable to anticipate or think about 
their personal futures.
Implications of Neo-!omism for the Problem of Animal Suering
So, the #omistic view of nonhuman animals needs updating. It certainly 
is outdated to explain animal cognition and behavior solely through the 
broad term “estimative power.” However, the crucial aspects of the #om-
istic view of nonhuman animals are in no danger of replacement.
In light of the #omistic view of nonhuman animal minds, it was 
92  For examples, see: William A. Roberts, “Are Animals Stuck in Time?” Psycholog-
ical Bulletin 128, no. 3 (2002): 473–89; Suddendorf and Busby, “Mental Time 
Travel in Animals?” 391–96; Tulving, “Episodic Memory and Autonoesis,” 3–56; 
#omas Suddendorf and Michael C. Corballis, “#e Evolution of Foresight: 
What Is Mental Time Travel, and Is It Unique to Humans?” Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 30 (2007): 299–313.
93  Tulving, “Episodic Memory and Autonoesis,” 48.
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shown that there is no conclusive evidence that nonhuman animals possess 
either higher-order (system 2) rationality or higher-order abilities associ-
ated with self-awareness, such as self-attributive or autonoetic metacogni-
tion and episodic memory. #us, nonhuman animals are not rational, do 
not have higher-order access to their mental states, and cannot remember 
or imagine themselves in the past, present, or future. #is is similar to the 
neo-Cartesian option 3: “Some non-human creatures have states that have 
intrinsic phenomenal qualities analogous to those possessed by humans 
when they are in states of pain. #ese creatures lack, however, any high-
er-order states of being aware of themselves as being in $rst-order states.”
#us, the evidence suggests that there is no problem of animal su"er-
ing. If nonhuman animals are neither rational nor self-aware, then they 
are not su"ering as persons. For one, nonhuman animals most likely lack 
higher-order access to their su"ering regardless of whether it is experienced 
phenomenally or not. If nonhuman animals are incapable of higher-order 
thoughts regarding their lower-order experiences, this means that nonhu-
man animals are incapable of higher-order thoughts such as “I believe that 
I feel pain” or “I believe that I wish to avoid pain.” As humans, we have 
higher-order access to our lower-order mental states throughout our entire 
lives. So it is hard to imagine what this would be like. However, the nonhu-
man animal’s lack of self-attributive or autonoetic metacognition sheds 
light on the nonpersonal nature of their experiences. As Aquinas argues, 
nonhuman animals do not know that they know or make judgments in a 
self-referential manner. As hard as it is to imagine, there are experiences 
of pain and su"ering in nonhuman animals but there are no personal 
thoughts/experiences/awarenesses of these experiences.
Also, nonhuman animals are most likely incapable of abstract rational-
ity. #is is relevant to the problem of animal su"ering because nonlinguis-
tic creatures could never form abstract concepts regarding their su"ering. 
For instance, arational animals cannot reach the understanding that they 
ought not to be in a state of pain or su"ering. Moreover, it is important 
to remember that their lack of rationality entails that they do not act for 
logical reasons. #us, arational animals cannot be said to have any logical 
reasons for acting in ways that avoid future experiences of pain. Pain 
behaviors are simply explainable through associative learning and, at most, 
anoetic and noetic metacognition.
In addition to the #omistic distinctives of metacognition and rational-
ity, it was found that nonhuman animals most likely lack episodic memory, 
and thus any sense of a personal past, present, and future. So, if they expe-
rience pain and su"ering, these are experienced only in a nonpersonal 
present. Nonhuman animals neither self-referentially remember su"ering 
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they have experienced, nor self-referentially experience current su"ering, 
nor self-referentially anticipate future su"ering they may encounter. #is is 
evidence for Aquinas’s notion that nonhuman animals lack a sense of self, 
diachronic or otherwise, because they are not aware of a personal process 
of abstracting and storing knowledge of universals.94
#ese considerations provide an answer to the problem of animal su"er-
ing not only as it relates to animal pain but also as it relates to any other 
type of su"ering that animals might experience, such as fear and sorrow. If 
nonhuman animals are not self-aware, then they lack higher-order access 
to any of these unpleasant states. #us, there is no person, qua person, that 
experiences pain or su"ering in the nonhuman animal kingdom.
An Objection to the Neo-!omistic Solution
A major objection at this point could be that the neo-#omistic concept 
of arational and nonpersonal animals does not avoid the problem. For 
example, when arguing against neo-Cartesian option 3 (which was noted 
as being similar to the neo-#omistic position), Robert Francescotti states:
It is not clear that position 3 is even coherent. We are to imagine 
that some other animals have mental states with “intrinsic phenom-
enal qualities analogous to those possessed by humans,” but they are 
not aware of being in those states, and so, Murray explains, “there 
is simply no victim or subject for whom it can be said that there is a 
way it is like for it to be in such a state of pain” (Murray 2008, 56). 
However, if these states are phenomenally similar to those we have, 
as 3 claims, then there would be a “what it is like” character to these 
states, and in particular they would have something similar to the 
distressful feel of our pain states. So there would be a clear sense in 
which some other animals su"er.95
Regardless of whether animals are persons, if they are experiencing 
unpleasant mental and physical states, then the evils remain. #is objec-
94  For further evidence along these lines, see Hans J. Markowitsch and Angelica 
Staniloiu, “Memory, Autonoetic Consciousness, and the Self,” Consciousness and 
Cognition 20 (2011): 16–39. Markowitsch and Staniloiu argue that autonoetic 
consciousness and episodic memory are required for “episodic-autobiographical 
memory,” or EAM (a diachronic sense of self ), and that EAM is probably unique 
to humans.
95  Francescotti, “#e Problem of Animal Pain and Su"ering,” 115–16 (citing Murray, 
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw).
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tion, however, seems to be avoidable through noting important distinc-
tions and reemphasizing the #omistic concept of consciousness.
First, it will be helpful to discuss a distinction that has been emphasized 
by Tulving. Tulving and his associates make a careful distinction between 
consciousness and awareness. He says that “consciousness” is “a general 
capacity that an individual possesses for particular kinds of mental repre-
sentations and subjective experiences.”96 “Awareness” is “a particular mani-
festation or expression of this general capacity.”97 Tulving explains that:
Consciousness, like other capacities of living systems, has no object; 
it is not directed at anything. It is like a stage that allows some 
actions, but not others, to take place on it, but it does not prescribe 
action. Awareness always has an object; it is always of something. 
#us, awareness presumes consciousness, but consciousness does 
not imply awareness: Consciousness is a necessary but not su`cient 
condition of awareness.98
Accordingly, I have been careful throughout this essay to use the 
terms “consciousness” and “self-awareness” when referring to humans and 
nonhuman animals.
Regardless, Francescotti says that pain states having a “what it is like” 
character are “clear” cases of nonhuman animal su"ering. But it is not 
clear that these are “clear” cases of su"ering. #is is because, as concluded 
above, it is likely that nonhuman animals are conscious of pain, but not 
that they are self-referentially aware of their pain. If nonhuman animals 
lack metacognitive abilities, then they can only be conscious of pain and 
su"ering. Pain and su"ering would be just one part of the kaleidoscope 
of their conscious experience. #ey would react to it according to their 
instincts and associatively learned behavior. If they possess lower-order 
metacognitive abilities, then they can be aware, yet not self-referentially 
aware, of pain and su"ering. #ey would experience, focus upon, and make 
judgments regarding pain and su"ering, yet they would not do this on a 
personal level.
Tulving’s three levels of consciousness and awareness (anoetic, noetic, 
and autonoetic) are helpful here as well. Of anoetic consciousness, he 
explains: “[It] is temporally and spatially bound to the current situation. 
Organisms possessing only anoetic consciousness are conscious in the 
96  Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, “Toward a #eory of Episodic Memory,” 335.
97  Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, “Toward a #eory of Episodic Memory,” 335.
98  Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, “Toward a #eory of Episodic Memory,” 335. 
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sense that they are capable of perceptually registering, internally represent-
ing, and behaviourally responding to aspects of the present environment, 
both external and internal.”99 Concerning noetic consciousness, he further 
states in the same place: “[It] allows an organism to be aware of, and to 
cognitively operate on, objects and events, and relations among objects 
and events, in the absence of these objects and events. #e organism can 
!exibly act upon such symbolic knowledge of the world.” As explained, 
nonhuman animals possess anoetic consciousness and possibly noetic 
consciousness, but not autonoetic consciousness.
If neo-Cartesian option 3 is necessarily tied to the “intrinsic phenom-
enal qualities” of states possessed by nonhuman animals, then perhaps 
Francescotti’s objection holds here. But as explained above, neo-#omism 
does not necessarily focus on “what it is like” for animals to experience 
the world, but only that they are conscious. #us, regardless of whether 
autonoetic consciousness is the only type of consciousness accompanied 
with qualia, noetic, or anoetic consciousness is all that is needed to meet 
the #omistic standard for consciousness. 
However, even if there is “something it is like” for animals to experience 
pain and su"ering, this does not mean that the experience is necessarily 
intrinsically evil. Getting back to Francescotti’s objection, as mentioned, 
it is not clear that the anoetic and noetic experiences of pain and su"ering 
constitute su"ering. #is can be shown by emphasizing two #omistic 
concepts.
Evil as Privation !eory
First, it is important to remember that #omism entails what is known as 
the “evil as privation theory.” Aquinas discusses evil in many places in his 
writings, but he probably de$nes it most clearly in his discussion in the 
Summa theologiae [ST]: “Evil is the absence of the good, which is natural 
and due to a thing.”100 It is important to note that, according to Aquinas, 
not all absences of good are evil, although all evils are absences of some 
good. In this regard, he is careful to make a distinction between “negative” 
and “privative” absences of good.101 Aquinas explains: 
Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would 
follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything 
99  Endel Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness,” Canadian Psychology 26 (1985): 
1–12, at 3.
100  ST I, q. 49, a. 1.
101  ST I, q. 48, a. 3. See also Aquinas, De malo, q. 1, a. 2.
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would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something 
else. . . . For instance, a man would be evil who had not the swi&ness 
of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken 
in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight 
is called blindness.102
As can be seen in Aquinas’s de$nition of evil, an absence of a good is 
evil only if the good is “natural and due” to a particular subject. For exam-
ple, it would be an evil for a human to be blind because sight is something 
humans should possess according to their natures. But it would not be an 
evil for a rock to be blind, as rocks do not naturally possess the ability to 
see.103 #e absence of sight in a human is a privation of a natural good, 
while the lack of sight in a rock is merely an absence of a good.
With this de$nition of evil in mind, it is clear that pain and su"ering 
cannot be evils according to the #omistic concept of “evil.” #e sensation 
of pain is thought to be a homeostatic emotion, similar to itching, hunger, 
and thirst.104 Without pain, the lifespan of humans and most nonhuman 
animals would be signi$cantly shorter.105 It is no secret that the ability 
to feel pain is crucial for nonhuman animal !ourishing. Additionally, 
researchers believe that other types of su"ering, such as sadness, fear, and 
even depression, are likewise homeostatic emotional responses that are 
conducive to physical and social survival.106
It is easy to conclude that God, as the creator of all human and nonhu-
man life, intended for animals to possess the abilities to anoetically and 
noetically experience pain and su"ering. He endowed his creatures with 
102  ST I, q. 48, a. 3.
103  ST I, q. 48, a. 5, ad 1.
104  See A. D. Craig, “A New View of Pain as a Homeostatic Emotion,” Trends in 
Neurosciences 26 (2003): 303–7.
105  For example, see Elna M. Nagasako, Anne Louise Oaklander, and Robert H. 
Dworkin, “Congenital Insensitivity to Pain: An Update,” Pain 101 (2003): 
213–19.
106  For examples, see: Norbert Schwarz, “Warmer and More Social: Recent Devel-
opments in Cognitive Social Psychology,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 
239–64, at 245; Dacher Keltner and Ann M. Kring, “Emotion, Social Function, 
and Psychopathology,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998): 320–342, at 324; 
Arne Öhman and Susan Mineka, “Fears, Phobias, and Preparedness: Toward 
an Evolved Module of Fear and Fear Learning,” Psychological Review 108, no. 3 
(2001): 483–522, at 483; and Nicholas B. Allen and Paul B. T. Badcock, “Darwin-
ian Models of Depression: A Review of Evolutionary Accounts of Mood and 
Mood Disorders,” Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological Psychiatry 
30 (2006): 815–26, at 819.
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these homeostatic emotions so that they would !ourish in their natural 
environments.107 In this way, pain and other forms of su"ering are not 
evil, since God wills creatures to possess these metaphysically and instru-
mentally good abilities. Both humans and nonhuman animals experience 
pain and su"ering, although nonhuman animals do not self-referentially 
experience pain and su"ering.
Su"ering as the Privation of the Willed Good
However, there is a particular sense in which Aquinas thought pain and 
su"ering could be viewed as evils. For example in ST, he mentions that 
evils are rightly divided into two categories: evils of punishment and evils 
of fault. In describing evils of punishment, Aquinas says:
Intellectual creatures also su"er evil when they are deprived of 
forms or dispositions or anything else potentially necessary for good 
activity, whether the things belong to the soul or the body or exter-
nal things. And such evil, in the judgment of the Catholic faith, 
needs to be called punishment.
For three things belong to the nature of a punishment. . . . 
#e second characteristic of the nature of punishment is that it is 
contrary to the will of the one su"ering punishment. For everyone’s 
will inclines to seek the person’s own good, and so it is contrary to 
one’s will to be deprived of one’s own good.108
Aquinas is here explaining that natural evils are rightly called punish-
ments in humans because the deprivation of the form or disposition of a 
human is against the will. In other words, no human wants to experience 
natural evils in his own body. #is would include the experience of pain 
and su"ering because such things are unwanted and unpleasant and entail 
a loss of user control.
However, if nonhuman animals do not possess immaterial intellects 
and if all of their actions are determined by the laws of nature, then they 
cannot possess free will. Pain and su"ering cannot be evils for them in the 
subjective sense, since they can neither understand that they are in pain 
107  To be clear, I am not saying that pain and su"ering are good in the sense that they 
ought to be sought for their own sakes. Instead, they are instrumental goods that 
help creatures !ourish.
108  De malo, q. 1, a. 4, in Aquinas, On Evil, trans. Richard Regan, ed. Brian Davies 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77.
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nor freely will to stop experiencing it. Of course, it may appear that they 
will to avoid pain as humans do, but they are not willing in a morally rele-
vant sense, as their pain-avoidance behavior is due to lower-order processes 
and not the higher-order wish to avoid the lower-order su"ering.
#us, from a #omistic perspective, animal pain and su"ering are not 
evil. #ey are not intrinsically evil states because they are good physio-
logical processes that are natural to nonhuman animals and necessary 
for !ourishing. Also, they are not evil in that they are not experienced 
self-referentially by nonhuman animals and cannot be against the will of 
nonhuman animals, since nonhuman animals do not possess free will.
Before concluding, it will be good to note an interesting aspect of the 
neo-#omistic answer to the problem of animal su"ering. As the evidence 
suggests, it is most likely that nonhuman animals are neither rational nor 
self-aware. While there are a few promising candidates, such as dolphins, 
elephants, and great apes, the majority of nonhuman animals are not 
considered to be possibly self-conscious.
Yet if it were conclusively determined that one of these candidates 
were in fact self-aware, this would not overturn the neo-#omistic 
answer to the problem of animal su"ering. #is is because, if it were 
determined that an animal is rational and self-aware, this would entail 
that the animal would possess a rational soul along with an immaterial 
intellect. #e reason that it would not be problematic is that Aquinas 
believed that rational animals can survive the death of their bodies due 
to the immateriality of the intellect.109
#us, if an animal were found to be rational and self-aware, it would 
follow that the animal could participate in the resurrection of the dead at 
the end of days. Since nonlinguistic animals do not know the di"erence 
between right and wrong and also could never understand the Gospel 
message, it is possible that they could live in the new heavens and new 
earth with human saints at the end of days. #us, a relatively short life 
involving su"ering would ultimately result in eternal life in the presence 
of God. #e su"ering of rational nonhuman animals (if such creatures 
were found to exist) would be allowed by God for the purpose of commu-
nicating his goodness. Perhaps God decided that the hierarchy of beings 
he creates to achieve his purpose should include rational nonhuman 
animals.110 So, even if a theist is in doubt as to the personhood of any 
109  ST I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG II, ch. 79–81; Q.D. de anima, a. 14.
110  For a discussion of the #omistic concepts of God’s purpose for the universe, the 
necessity of a hierarchy of beings, what it means for God to “communicate his 
goodness,” and what these entail for the problem of animal su"ering, see B. Kyle 
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particular animal, they can conclude that, if the animal is self-aware, the 
animal will ultimately experience a fate similar to that of humans who join 
God in eternity.
Conclusion
So it seems that the philosophy of #omas Aquinas, along with contem-
porary philosophical and scienti$c evidence, provides a solution to the 
problem of animal su"ering. Aquinas believed that the di"erence between 
human and nonhuman animals is that the former possess rational souls 
and the latter possess merely sensitive souls. As rational animals, humans 
possess immaterial intellects, which give them the abilities of rationality 
and self-awareness. #e lack of an immaterial intellect makes it such that 
nonhumans animals are neither rational nor self-aware, and therefore lack 
moral agency and personhood.
Contemporary philosophical and scienti$c evidence supports Aquinas’s 
medieval theory of animal minds. #e evidence suggests that nonhuman 
animals are incapable of abstract reasoning and lack higher-order meta-
cognitive abilities and episodic memory. #us, nonhuman animals do not 
experience pain and su"ering as persons. #ey do not have higher-order 
access to their lower-order mental states and they cannot self-referentially 
remember or anticipate painful experiences. Also, they cannot come to the 
understanding that they ought not be in pain.
It could be objected that this does not solve the problem, since animals 
are phenomenologically aware of pain and su"ering. However, it was 
shown that this cannot be understood as evil because pain and su"ering 
are metaphysically and instrumentally good physiological processes. So, 
pain and su"ering are not evil because they are not privations of proper 
goods and are conducive to !ourishing. Moreover, pain and other unpleas-
ant states are not evils in nonhuman animals because nonhuman animals 
do not possess free will.
#e evidence suggests that nonhuman animals are most likely not self-
aware and that there is no problem of animal su"ering. However, even if 
a certain kind of nonhuman animal were found to possess self-awareness, 
this would not eliminate the neo-#omistic answer. Instead, all it would 
entail is that the certain kind of animal would most likely be rewarded 
with eternal life at the end of days. #us, neo-#omism not only provides 
an answer to the problem of animal su"ering but also provides a more 
compelling answer than does neo-Cartesianism. Most researchers believe 
Keltz, “God’s Purpose for the Universe and the Problem of Animal Su"ering,” 
Sophia (2017): 1–18.
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that nonhuman animals are conscious, but few, if any, believe that nonhu-
man animals are self-aware like humans. N&V
